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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
been followed by a number of other courts, 9 including the court
in the instant case, thus establishing a trend.
10
There are however a number of recent decisions which deny
recovery.1 1 The theory advanced in these cases is that the
wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law
and to permit recovery is to indulge in judicial legislation.2
It is reasoned that there is no person in being at the time of
the injury to whom the defendant owes a duty of care.1" It'
has also been pointed out that if the action can be maintained,
it would necessarily follow that an infant could recover against
its own mother for injuries occasioned by her negligence
while pregnant with it.
4
The question has not yet arisen in North Dakota. It is sub-
mitted that where independent existence is possible and life
is destroyed through a wrongful act, a cause of action arises
under our wrongful death statute. This view is in accord with




FORGIVENESS-The plaintiff, husband, filed suit for divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The defendant filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the case on the ground that the parties had
resumed cohabitation during pendency of the suit. During
this period the defendant moved her personal effects back
into the abode and the parties occupied the same double-bed
and indulged in sexual intercourse. The defendant appealed
from the court's granting of a divorce. On appeal the Florida
Supreme Court held, one justice dissenting, that resumption
of cohabitation during pendency of suit was not condonation
requiring dismissal of the suit, where the element of forgive-
ness was lacking. The dissent argued that under the circum-
stances condonation appeared as a matter of law and was re-
9. Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Mitchell v. Couch,
285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d
249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
10. PROSSER, TORTS, § 36 (2d ed. 1955); 9 Kan. L. Rev. 343 (1961).
11. Norm-an v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Howell v. Rushing, 261
P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221
(1958).
12. See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Ho-
gan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
13. See West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
14. Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704, 707 (1901) (dictum).
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quired from the public interest in morality. Seiferth v. Sei-
ferth, 132 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1961).
Forgiveness, either express or implied, is an essential ele-
ment of condonation, and is more readily presumed against
the husband than the wife.2 The importance of this essential
element is that although condonation is an affirmative defense
and must be specifically pleaded, 3 the coirt may in its discre-
tion deny the divorce, if there is evidence that the party
wronged actually forgave the other.
4
Differences exist among the various jurisdictions regarding
the necessity of forgiveness and methods for determining the
presence of forgiveness. Some states will imply forgiveness
from the circumstances,- while others require an express for-
giveness in cases of cruelty.; However, even in states where
forgiveness can be implied from the circumstances,' the ma-
jority of courts hold that cohabitation or sexual intercourse9
alone will not establish condonation without the intent to for-
give.1o
However, there is authority holding that as a matter of pub-
lic policy, acts of intercourse after filing of a suit amount to
condonation.11 In fact, one court has held that sexual inter-
course is conclusive proof of condonation.'2 This argument
has little merit when applying what may be termed the "pa-
tient forbearence rule". This rule enables the innocent party
to try and save the marriage by continuing sexual cohabita-
1. Cox v. Cox, 267 Ala. 72, 100 So. 2d 35 (1958); Barber v. Barber, 327
Mich. 5, 41 N.W.2d 463 (1950); Mandelin v. Mandelin, 120 Minn. 198, 139
N.W. 152 (1913); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d 381 (1952).
2. Brinson v. Brinson, 201 Ga. 540, 40 S.E.2d 535 (1946) stating that in
the case of the wife forgiveness was not to be presumed; Glass v. Glass,
175 Md. 693, 2 A.2d 443 (1938).
3. McGaughy v. McGaughy, 410 Ill. 596, 102 N.E.2d 806 (1951); Winnard
v. Winnard, 62 Ohio App. 351, 23 N.E.2d 977 (1939).
4. Crews v. Crews, 130 Fla. 499, 178 So. 139 (1938).
5. Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922); Collins v. Collins,
195 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940).
6. Whinnery v. Whinnery, 21 Cal. App. 59, 130 Pac. 1065 (1913); Bickford
v. Bickford, 94 Mont. 314, 22 P.2d 306 (1933); Hollingsworth v. Hollings-
worth, 191 Ore. 374, 229 P.2d 956 (1951).
7. Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922); Collins v. Collins,
195 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940).
8. Heckman v. Heckman, 235 Ind. App. 472, 134 N.E.2d 695 (1956);
Mandelin v. Mandelin, 120 Minn. 198, 139 N.W. 152 (1913); Norman v. Nor-
man, 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S.E. 407 (1921).
9. Fordice v. Fordice, 126 Ind. App. 562, 132 N.E.2d 618 (1956): Ramsey
v. Ramsey, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d 381 (1952) (making the distinction that
in cases of adultery, the general rule Is that a single act of intercourse
will suffice as condonation).
10. Cox v. Cox, 267 Ala. 72, 100 So. 2d 35 (1958); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 126
Ind. App. 377, 133 N.E.2d 79 (1956); Norman v. Norman, 88 W. Va. 640. 107
S.E. 407 (1921).
11. Cf. Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 16 111. App. 2d 286, 148 N.E.2d 327
(1958).
12. Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 185 (1922) (holding that al-
though sexual intercourse was not an essential element of condonation, it
was conclusive evidence thereof).
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tion without weakening his other right to relief. 13
Several states have adopted statutes which require an ex-
press agreement to condone acts constituting the cause for
divorce on the grounds of cruelty. 14 Under such statutes ex-
press forgiveness in cases of cruelty is required, 15 and acts of
sexual intercourse alone are not enough to establish the de-
fense of condonation.16 The law of condonation in North
Dakota is governed by such a statute,17 which requires in
cases of cruelty, an express agreement to condone the of-
fense.18
It is submitted that the result reached by the majority in
the instant case was the correct one; as implying forgiveness
as a matter of public policy will not save a marriage which
has all but failed. Of course, divorce should not be encouraged
nor allowed without cogent proof of marital discord; but in
the same vein the defense of condonation should be one that
must be established by more than mere physical acts, of the
parties without any intent to restore conjugal rights.
PAUL A. MUEHILER
RELEASE-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-JOINT TORTFEA-
SORS-The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which
was involved in a collision with defendant's truck. The release
he gave to the driver of the automobile recited the release
of the driver and any and all other persons of any and every
claim or cause of action arising out of the collision. The plain-
tiff later brought an action against the defendant as a joint
tort-feasor. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, two jus-
tices dissenting, that under the Uniform Contribution Among
13. Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 603 (1951) (stating that the
patient endurance by one spouse of the ill-treatment of the other should
never be allowed to weaken his or her right to relief); Fansler v. Fansler,
344 Mich. 569, 75 N.W.2d 1 (1956).
14. Am example of such an enactment is: Cal. Civil Code § 118. "Where
the cause of divorce consists of a course of offensive conduct, or arises, in
cases of cruelty, from excessive acts of ill-treatment which may, aggre-
gately, constitute the offense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or con-
jugal kindness, shall not be evidence of condonation of any of the acts
constituting such cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to
condone."
15. Whinnery v. Whinnery, 21 Cal. App. 59, 130 Pac. 1065 (1913); Bren-
nan v. Brennan, 183 Ore. 269, 192 P.2d 858 (1948).
16. Schletewitz v. Schletewitz, 85 Cal. App. 2d 366, 193 P.2d 34 (1948).
17. N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-13 (1961). . . . .When the cause of divorce
consists of a course of offensive conduct or arises in cases of cruelty from
successive acts of ill treatment, which aggregately may consitute the of-
fense, cohabitation, or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness shall not
be evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such cause,
unless accompanied by an express agreement to condone."
18. Fleck v. Fleck, 79 N.D. 561, 58 N.W.2d 765 (1953).
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